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Ukraine Strikes Russian UAV Storage at Donetsk Airport with SCALP-EG and GBU-39 SDB-I

Source: Ukrainian General Staff / United24 Media | Date: 13–14 April 2026 | Classification: Open Source — AI-Assisted Technical Assessment

PRECISION STRIKE SCALP-EG GBU-39 SDB-I Su-24M BROACH WARHEAD

Technical Summary

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reports that Ukrainian Air Force aircraft struck Russian Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) storage facilities at the former Donetsk International Airport (Sergey Prokofiev Airport, ICAO UKCC) overnight 13–14 April 2026. Reported weapons were the Franco-British Systeme de Croisiere Autonome a Longue Portee d'Emploi General (SCALP-EG) / Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile and the Raytheon GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb, Increment I (SDB-I), delivered from modified Sukhoi Su-24M "Fencer-D" strike aircraft. Concurrent strikes reportedly hit logistics nodes and ammunition depots at Azovske (Zaporizhzhia Oblast), Urzuf and Kulykivske (Donetsk Oblast).

The Donetsk airport complex has been a documented forward operating site for Russian strike UAS (loitering munitions and one-way attack systems including the Iranian Shahed-136 / Geran-2 series). Target-set selection at the munitions-and-launchers layer — as opposed to attempted air-defence attrition — reflects a shift toward left-of-launch magazine depletion.

Analysis of Effects

The SCALP-EG is a turbojet-powered, low-observable air-launched cruise missile with a published range exceeding 250 kilometres (some variants >400 km), cruise at high subsonic (~Mach 0.8), terrain-following mid-course navigation using Terrain Reference Navigation (TRN) and Global Positioning System (GPS) / Inertial Navigation System (INS) fused inputs, and Imaging Infrared (IIR) terminal guidance with autonomous target identification against a stored reference image. Missile launch mass is approximately 1,300 kg. The warhead is the MBDA BROACH (Bomb Royal Ordnance Augmented Charge), a two-stage configuration comprising a shaped-charge precursor (Augmenting Charge Penetrator Warhead) that defeats hardened cover, followed by a programmable delay main HE fragmentation charge of approximately 450 kg gross with approximately 200–225 kg Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of insensitive main charge fill (reported as Augmented Blast Explosive, a cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine-based formulation).

The GBU-39/B SDB-I is a 110-kilogramme-class precision glide bomb with a 93 kg gross weight, diamond-wing stand-off glide, GPS/INS guidance, approximately 110 kilometres range from release from a fast jet, and a 16–17 kg AFX-757-filled multi-purpose warhead capable of penetrating approximately 91 centimetres of 5,000-pounds-per-square-inch reinforced concrete before main-charge detonation. SDB-I applies a programmable Height-of-Burst (HOB) fuze (FMU-152 Joint Programmable Fuze).

Combining a 200+ kg NEQ BROACH strike with multiple 16 kg AFX-757 SDB-I warheads produces a graded-effect employment: SCALP-EG for hardened shelters and UAS primary storage bunkers with earth-cover/concrete overburden; SDB-I for dispersed soft-skin UAS pallets, propellant stores, and ground-support equipment across the 300+ hectare airport footprint. For a UAS-storage target set, the operational logic is to induce sympathetic detonation of stored fuel-air warheads on Iranian-design loitering munitions at the 40–50 kg NEQ equivalent per round, with lethal radius (LR) propagation between dispersed storage bays.

Launch-platform signature is informative. The Su-24M is not a native SCALP-EG carrier; integration was a post-2023 Ukrainian adaptation using an auxiliary power unit pylon and modified stores-management system software. That integration has now matured into a reusable operational tool, reducing launch-aircraft attrition risk by preserving Su-24M stand-off distance against Russian S-400 engagement envelopes (reported at approximately 400 kilometres for 48N6DM rounds).

Personnel and Safety Considerations

For Ammunition Technician (AT) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel reading the battle-damage picture, three points are relevant. First, Failed-To-Function (FTF) SCALP-EG rounds present a significant Category "A" EOD problem: the shaped-charge precursor and main-charge combination, combined with a turbojet fuel load of approximately 200 kg of kerosene equivalent, creates a hazardous condition requiring specialist rendering. Russian EOD has published Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) on recovered SCALP bodies since 2023; Ukrainian counter-intelligence has focused on denying usable samples. Second, FTF SDB-I rounds are a known population of UXO in the current theatre with recovered examples exhibiting failed warhead function and partial penetration. The AFX-757 fill is classified HD 1.2 in some configurations but the warhead-plus-fuze assembly should be treated as HD 1.1 Compatibility Group E (CG E). Third, secondary hazards — sympathetic detonation of stored Shahed-136 variants — produce an Unplanned Explosion at Munitions Sites (UEMS)-class event, consistent with Small Arms Survey UEMS typology.

Data Gaps

DATA GAP: Exact munitions expenditure (SCALP-EG count, SDB-I count, drone count) not disclosed by Ukrainian General Staff.

DATA GAP: Target coordinates within the Donetsk airport footprint and specific bunker/hardstand numbers not published.

DATA GAP: Russian stored UAS inventory at time of strike (Geran-2/Shahed-136, Shahed-238, Lancet-3 variant counts) not confirmed.

DATA GAP: Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) imagery not released; General Staff report cites "confirmed impacts" only.

DATA GAP: Collateral effects and any secondary UEMS propagation across adjacent bunkers not reported.

DATA GAP: Launch aircraft tail numbers, launch point, and time-on-target data withheld under operational security.

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Source reliability B / Accuracy 3 (NATO STANAG 2022) — drawn from Ukrainian General Staff communications via United24 Media; pending independent corroboration via commercial satellite imagery.