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Memmingen Airport: Three WWII Fragmentation Bombs Rendered Safe After Construction-Site Find

Source: Bavarian State Police / Meyka | Date: 14–15 April 2026 | Classification: Open Source — AI-Assisted Technical Assessment

UXO EOD ERW GERMANY FRAGMENTATION BOMB

Technical Summary

Construction workers at Allgäu Airport Memmingen (Flughafen Memmingen, ICAO EDJA) in Bavaria exposed three World War II-era aerial fragmentation bombs near the terminal and tower complex on 14 April 2026. Bavarian State Police Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists from the Kampfmittelbeseitigungsdienst (KMBD) Bayern were tasked with Render Safe Procedure (RSP). A cordon of 300 metres was established, airport operations were suspended, and the devices were neutralised in situ by 00:03 hours local on 15 April 2026 with no reported casualties or damage.

Each item is reported as a fragmentation bomb of approximately 10 kilograms gross weight. The most probable candidates in that mass class, given an Allgäu/southern Germany context, are: the German Luftwaffe SD 10 Splitterbombe (Sprengbombe-Dickwandig, 10 kg, pre-formed fragmentation case, typically Trinitrotoluene [TNT] or Amatol fill); or United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) AN-M41 or AN-M41A1 20-lb (~9 kg) general-purpose fragmentation bombs (typically 50/50 Amatol or TNT fill, AN-M110 nose fuze). In either case the ordnance would have been dropped between 1944 and May 1945 during Allied air campaigns or during Luftwaffe dispersal operations at surrounding airfields. The Memmingen aerodrome — a former Luftwaffe base — sits within a known residual Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) belt.

Analysis of Effects

At ~10 kg gross, the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of each device is of the order of 1.5–4.5 kg TNT equivalent depending on fill type and condition. Under AASTP-1 Change 4 quantity-distance (QD) rules for Hazard Division (HD) 1.1 ordnance, a single item at this NEQ yields an inhabited building distance (IBD) inside 180 m and a public traffic route distance (PTRD) well inside 150 m. A 300 m cordon is therefore compliant with, and more conservative than, the minimum stand-off for protection of personnel in the open against primary fragmentation and overpressure for a single high-order detonation. It also accommodates potential sympathetic detonation across the three items if the Concurrent Activity had been required.

The lethal radius (LR) for exposed personnel from an SD 10-class pre-formed fragmentation body is approximately 30–40 m; casualty radius (CR) for unprotected personnel extends to roughly 100–150 m under ideal fragment carry conditions. The 300 m Memmingen cordon, reinforced by terminal and hangar structures, applied appropriate margin under the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle as applied to UK-equivalent Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 duty of care standards. German EOD practice under the Kampfmittelverordnung (Ordnance Regulation) imposes broadly analogous responsibility.

Personnel and Safety Considerations

Three points carry forward. First, the fuzing assessment is determinative. German WWII chemical-long-delay fuzes (such as the Rheinmetall Type 17 or 28 series) and USAAF AN-M110 impact fuzes both become progressively more unstable after eight decades of burial. Any Failed-To-Function (FTF) or partially armed fuze presents a step-change in sensitivity, particularly to shock and friction during excavation. Second, the construction-site discovery mechanism — mechanical excavation, not a planned UXO survey — is a known causal chain for ERW incidents in Europe. German Federal policy under the Baugesetzbuch (Federal Building Code) permits local authorities to require Kampfmittelfreiheitsbescheinigung (ordnance clearance certification) prior to ground works; the Memmingen event underlines the case for extending such requirements to all former Luftwaffe airfield footprints. Third, the overnight 23:00–00:03 execution window reduced population-at-risk but imposed low-light constraints on the EOD team; under NATO Standard AEODP-03 (Allied Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication) this is permissible where delay would increase overall risk.

Allied Ordnance Publication (AOP)-4394 and UK Joint Service Publication (JSP) 364 Volume 2 (Defence EOD) both require render-safe decisions to weigh burial condition, fuze state, and proximity to critical infrastructure. A working aerodrome with live fuel stores at 300–500 m would weight the decision matrix toward low-order disruption or controlled in-situ disposal rather than lift-and-shift — consistent with the reported outcome.

Data Gaps

DATA GAP: Specific ordnance designation (SD 10, AN-M41, or other 10 kg-class fragmentation type) not confirmed by Bavarian authorities.

DATA GAP: Fuze condition, fuze type, and whether items were armed-live, armed-failed, or unarmed not disclosed.

DATA GAP: Disposal technique — whether low-order disruption (Explosively Formed Projectile-type charge), deflagration, or full in-situ high-order detonation — not reported. A 300 m cordon is consistent with either disruption or full high-order of the complete NEQ.

DATA GAP: Burial depth and soil medium not reported; both are determinative for blast coupling and fragment throw calculations.

DATA GAP: Pre-works ordnance survey status for the Memmingen construction project not disclosed.

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Source reliability B / Accuracy 3 (NATO STANAG 2022) — drawn from a single specialist media report with Bavarian state police attribution, pending corroboration from the KMBD Bayern operational record.