Ukrainian Support Forces personnel conducting mine-clearance operations with handheld detection equipment
Ukrainian Support Forces demining operations, October 2022. Photo: Support Forces of Ukraine Command, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

GICHD Geneva: Civilian ERW Casualty Surge Frames April 2026 Mine-Action Agenda

Technical Summary

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) are convening two back-to-back high-level mine-action events in Geneva this week: the Ukraine Mine Action Partner Coordination Workshop on 20–21 April 2026 — co-hosted with Ukraine's Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture and opened today — and the 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers on 22–24 April 2026. The convening rationale, published by GICHD in mid-April, is a globally rising civilian casualty curve from Anti-Personnel Mines (APM), Anti-Vehicle Mines (AVM), cluster submunitions, and wider Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) — with Syria alone recording more than 1,600 ERW casualties in 2025 and Ukraine exceeding 1,200 fatalities.

The Maison de la Paix in Geneva, headquarters of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
Maison de la Paix, Sécheron, Geneva — headquarters of GICHD and venue for this week's coordination workshop. Photo: Guilhem Vellut, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0.

The operational consequence for the WOME community is a reframing of mine-action from a post-conflict reconstruction task to a live-conflict protection-of-civilians task. That shift changes clearance doctrine, the risk envelope placed on national EOD cadres and commercial operators, and the funding logic underpinning Allied capacity-building.

>90% Civilian share of global explosive-ordnance victims (GICHD)
100M+ People across 60+ countries facing daily ERW risk
~132,000 km² GICHD operational contamination baseline for Ukraine
38% Frontline Ukrainian agricultural enterprises reporting ERW risk

Analysis of Effects

The Syrian 2025 figure (1,600+ ERW casualties) is drawn from the Humanitarian Needs Overview and confirmed through UNMAS data. The case-mix is dominated by three ordnance families: (i) unexploded or abandoned cluster submunitions from multiple parent systems (Russian, Syrian, and legacy Western-supply), (ii) improvised anti-vehicle mines and pressure-plate IEDs along returnee routes, and (iii) legacy air-dropped munitions ranging from 250–500 kg nominal HE bombs to smaller fragmentation bomblets. The Ukrainian casualty count reflects a parallel but distinct contamination profile: scatterable mine systems (POM-2/POM-3, PTM-1/PTM-3), 9N210/9N235 cluster submunitions, and AXO from retreating forces.

Participants emphasised “the critical importance of consolidating international support to overcome one of the world's largest mine contamination problems caused by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.” — Ukrainian Embassy in Switzerland, opening readout, 20 April 2026

The two agendas in Geneva reflect this bifurcation. The Ukraine workshop (20–21 April) aligns international support with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy, which targets a decade-plus clearance horizon at current throughput. The 29th International Meeting of National Directors (22–24 April) sets the global doctrinal baseline under which IMAS and UNMAS technical notes evolve. Of particular WOME relevance is the expected revision cycle for IMAS 09.12 (EOD clearance of ammunition storage-area explosions), IMAS 09.30 (Conventional EOD), and IMAS 10.40 (Information management for mine action), each of which has been pressure-tested by the 2022–2026 operating tempo.

UK stakes in these events are direct. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) funds mine-action programmes through the Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP) and HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) partnerships. The Defence EOD, Munitions and Search Training Regiment (DEMSTR) delivers Allied capacity-building. UK operators including Zetica, 6 Alpha, Dynasafe BACTEC, and Fellows International feature in Ukraine's accredited demining operator list. Any revision to IMAS technical baselines feeds directly into the UK commercial UXO sector's accreditation requirements and the MoD's Defence Ordnance, Munitions and Explosives (OME) Safety Management regime under DSA 03.OME.

Personnel and Safety Considerations

PFM-1 anti-personnel scatterable mines gathered for controlled disposal in Kherson, Ukraine
PFM-1 (“petal”) anti-personnel scatterable mines collected by Ukrainian police bomb-disposal teams for controlled destruction, Dniprovsky district, Kherson, August 2024. Photo: National Police of Ukraine, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.
“#MineAction saves lives and enables economic reconstruction and development. This is a key priority of 🇨🇭 support to 🇺🇦.” — Jacques Gerber, Swiss Federal Council Delegate for Ukraine, 20 April 2026
What to watch, 21–24 April. Day 2 of the partner workshop will focus on international-support coordination and long-term recovery pathways. The 29th NDM-UN29 (22–24 April) is expected to advance IMAS revisions and global doctrinal baselines. Official outcomes are expected to be published through GICHD, UNMAS, and the Ukrainian Embassy in Switzerland.

Data Gaps

DATA GAP: The Syria 2025 casualty figure is a preliminary UNMAS estimate; final case-mix by ordnance family will appear in the next Landmine Monitor cycle.
DATA GAP: Ukraine contamination estimates continue to range — 174,000 km² (declared-hazard baseline), ~132,000 km² (GICHD operational working figure), sub-30,000 km² (confirmed-hazard residual after non-technical survey). These measure different things and can coexist. The Geneva workshop is expected to narrow the gap on confirmed-hazard residual.
DATA GAP: The extent to which IMAS 09.30 will be amended to reflect non-permissive AO force-protection requirements is not yet public.
DATA GAP: UK FCDO funding commitments for the next tranche of GMAP are still subject to the 2026 Spending Review envelope.

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Source reliability B / Accuracy 2 (NATO STANAG 2022) — drawn from GICHD press material, UNMAS programme data, publicly available national mine-action strategies, and the Ukrainian Embassy in Switzerland opening readout of 20 April 2026.

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