From F-35 to Eurofighter: Türkiye Secures a Western Fighter on Its Own Terms

The F-35 Ejection: How Air Defence Sanctions Killed a Fighter Programme

In July 2019, as Russian S-400 air defence systems arrived in Ankara, the United States responded with immediate sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and unilaterally ejected Türkiye from the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter programme. Türkiye had invested over $1.4 billion in the programme and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) was manufacturing fuselage centre sections, pylons, and weapon-bay doors for the global F-35 supply chain. Ankara had ordered 100 F-35A aircraft.

The ejection removed those 100 aircraft from Türkiye’s force structure plan and left the Turkish Air Force (Türk Hava Kuvvetleri) facing a generational capability gap. The ageing F-16 fleet — the backbone of Turkish combat aviation since the 1980s — was approaching structural limits. Without the F-35, Türkiye had no path to a fifth-generation fighter within the Western alliance framework.

As of May 2026, CAATSA sanctions remain fully in effect. The Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı (SSB — Presidency of Defence Industries) and four senior officials remain designated under Section 231. Diplomatic momentum toward resolution has accelerated significantly in early 2026 — driven partly by the Iranian missile threat that prompted NATO’s Patriot deployments to Türkiye — but no lifting, suspension, or waiver has been announced.

Ankara’s response was not capitulation but strategic redirection. Unable to acquire the F-35 and unwilling to accept permanent dependence on American goodwill, Türkiye turned to Europe’s most capable multi-role combat aircraft: the Eurofighter Typhoon.

October 2025: The £8 Billion Deal

On 27 October 2025, Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and UK Defence Secretary John Healey signed a bilateral agreement for the supply of 20 new-build Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft to Türkiye. The United Kingdom described the deal as worth “up to £8 billion” — characterising it as the largest single defence export in British history. Türkiye’s Ministry of National Defence subsequently placed the cost of the 20 new-build aircraft alone at approximately £5.4 billion; the higher UK figure encompasses the full package including the training and technical support contracts formalised in March 2026.

The agreement was negotiated directly between London and Ankara, bypassing the Eurofighter consortium’s four-nation governance structure (Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) that had previously blocked Turkish acquisition attempts. Germany’s objections — rooted in human rights concerns and persistent bilateral political tensions — were overridden by the UK acting unilaterally as the lead national authority for the export.

The initial tranche comprises 20 new-build Tranche 4 Typhoons manufactured by BAE Systems at Warton, Lancashire. These aircraft will be equipped with the Euroradar CAPTOR-E active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, MBDA Brimstone precision-guided air-to-surface weapons, and Rolls-Royce EJ200 turbofan engines. Final assembly takes place at the Warton facility, with first deliveries now scheduled for 2030, with full operational capability anticipated from the early 2030s.

The Qatari and Omani Transfers: Bridging the Capability Gap

Beyond the 20 new-build aircraft, Türkiye has secured a transfer of 12 Eurofighter Typhoons from Qatar’s existing fleet. Qatar had ordered 24 Typhoons from BAE Systems in 2017; the transfer of 12 of those aircraft to Türkiye reflects both Doha’s shifting procurement priorities and Ankara’s determination to field Typhoons ahead of the new-build deliveries scheduled for 2030. The first Qatari aircraft were expected to arrive in Türkiye in February 2026. Qatar’s Typhoons are Tranche 3A airframes equipped with the ECRS Mk 0 — the early-generation AESA radar first integrated onto the Typhoon platform — representing a materially superior radar capability to the Captor-M mechanically scanned array carried by earlier Tranche 1 and 2 aircraft.

An additional 12 aircraft are being sourced from Oman. The ex-Omani Typhoons will transit through BAE Systems facilities in the United Kingdom for a comprehensive modernisation programme before delivery, with transfer anticipated in 2028. This phased approach brings Türkiye’s planned Eurofighter fleet to 44 airframes — sufficient to equip two operational squadrons with meaningful reserves.

The fleet expansion from 20 to 44 aircraft transforms the Typhoon acquisition from a capability stopgap into a substantive force-structure change. Forty-four Typhoons, equipped with Meteor and Brimstone and operating alongside upgraded F-16 Block 70 Viper aircraft, give Türkiye a credible layered air superiority and precision-strike capability that is fully interoperable with NATO command and control architectures — unlike the S-400, which remains isolated from Alliance networks.

25 March 2026: Multi-Billion-Pound Training and Support Contract Signed

The commercial and contractual architecture of the Typhoon acquisition was substantially completed on 25 March 2026, when Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler and UK Defence Secretary John Healey signed a multi-billion-pound comprehensive training and technical support agreement in London. The contract was described by the UK Ministry of Defence as resolving the “logistics knot” that had delayed finalisation of Türkiye’s full Typhoon support framework.

Under the contract, BAE Systems will provide the following over the initial support period:

• Spare parts and consumables — full supply chain for the Turkish Air Force’s Typhoon fleet from entry into service
• Support equipment — ground support, maintenance tooling, and depot-level infrastructure
• Electronic warfare capabilities — including integration of the Typhoon’s Defensive Aids Sub-System (DASS) with Turkish Air Force threat libraries
• High-fidelity flight simulators — mission-representative full-mission simulators and procedural trainers
• Long-term maintenance support — third-line maintenance, component repair, and technical data provision
• Training infrastructure — mission planning systems, synthetic training environments, and courseware

Training Programme

The United Kingdom will train an initial cohort of 10 Turkish Air Force instructor pilots in the United Kingdom, covering all phases of the Typhoon conversion and advanced combat training syllabus. The instructor pipeline is designed to generate Türkiye’s own organic training capacity once the aircraft enter service. In parallel, approximately 100 ground crew technicians will undergo specialist training covering mechanical systems, avionics, weapons and mission systems integration, and long-term maintenance sustainment. Training for pilots and ground crews assigned to the first squadron is targeted for completion by mid-2027. The support contract covers an initial three-year period from the aircraft’s entry into service, with options for extension through the fleet’s operational life.

Turkish Indigenous Weapons Integration

In a parallel development with strategic significance, the United Kingdom approved in March 2026 the integration of Turkish-designed indigenous weapons onto Türkiye’s Eurofighter Typhoon fleet. This approval — covering systems developed by ROKETSAN and ASELSAN — represents a substantive concession to Ankara’s long-standing demand that any Western fighter acquisition preserve Türkiye’s indigenous weapons sovereignty. It also reduces Türkiye’s dependence on UK-supplied MBDA munitions for the life of the programme.

The F-35 Question Reopens: Diplomatic Momentum in 2026

The Eurofighter deal does not appear to have closed the door on Türkiye’s F-35 ambitions. Parallel diplomatic activity in late 2025 and early 2026 has opened a separate track that, if successful, could eventually return Ankara to the Joint Strike Fighter programme — raising the prospect of Türkiye operating both fourth-generation Typhoons and fifth-generation F-35As simultaneously, alongside the indigenous TAI KAAN.

Trump Administration Signals Openness

In December 2025, the Trump administration announced it was “very seriously considering” approving the sale of F-35A aircraft to Türkiye. US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack stated that “the United States is in ongoing discussions with Türkiye regarding their desire to rejoin the F-35 programme and their possession of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system,” adding that he believed the dispute could be resolved within four to six months. President Erdoğan, speaking in January 2026, reiterated that Türkiye’s removal from the programme had been “unjust” and that Ankara’s reentry was important for NATO’s collective security.

The S-400 Divestment Question

The single non-negotiable condition for F-35 reinstatement remains the removal of the S-400 system. US law explicitly prohibits Türkiye’s participation in the F-35 programme while the Russian system remains in its possession. In a significant diplomatic signal, President Erdoğan raised the possibility of returning the S-400 systems to Russia with President Putin in late 2025, with financial offsetting against Türkiye’s existing energy import debts to Moscow under discussion as a mechanism. The Kremlin subsequently denied the S-400 return had been formally tabled; Türkiye’s government has not made a definitive public commitment. Ankara also appears to hope that its role as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine — a position that gives Türkiye leverage with Moscow — could facilitate Russian acceptance of the system’s return.

Congressional Barriers Remain

Significant Congressional resistance to any F-35 sale persists. In September 2025, US lawmakers proposed amendments to the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that would explicitly prohibit F-35 sales to Türkiye unless the White House certified that Ankara does not “substantially support Hamas or any of its factions,” poses no military threat to Israel, and has halted cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. As of May 2026, CAATSA sanctions remain in full effect; no waiver, suspension, or executive relief has been announced.

Eurofighter Typhoon — Turkish Acquisition Summary (Updated May 2026)

KAAN: The Indigenous Fifth-Generation Programme

The Eurofighter acquisition does not represent Türkiye’s long-term combat aviation strategy. That role belongs to the TAI KAAN (formerly TF-X), Türkiye’s indigenous fifth-generation stealth fighter programme. KAAN completed its maiden flight on 21 February 2024 and is projected to enter Turkish Air Force service in the late 2020s to early 2030s, with a phased capability roadmap extending to full operational capability with indigenous engines and sensors by the mid-2030s.

The Eurofighter Typhoon fills a critical bridge role: it provides Türkiye with a modern, NATO-interoperable combat aircraft during the decade-long period between F-35 ejection and KAAN maturity. Without the Typhoon, Türkiye would have faced the 2025–2035 period relying entirely on upgraded F-16 Block 70 Viper aircraft — an aircraft that, while capable, does not match the Typhoon’s air superiority performance envelope or weapons integration depth.

The Strategic Calculus: Why the Eurofighter Matters

The Typhoon deal carries significance beyond its technical parameters. The United Kingdom negotiated bilaterally and overrode objections from Germany, which had previously blocked Eurofighter sales to Türkiye on human-rights grounds. London’s willingness to proceed demonstrates the extent to which the renewed Iranian threat and Türkiye’s NATO realignment have reshaped European strategic calculations.

For BAE Systems, the contract secures the Warton production line beyond 2030 and positions the UK as Türkiye’s primary European defence partner. For Türkiye, the Eurofighter represents an outcome the S-400 purchase was always designed to provoke: forcing Western nations to supply advanced military technology on more equitable terms rather than demanding unconditional compliance as the price of access.

The April 2026 UK–Türkiye Strategic Partnership agreement formalised this realignment, establishing a bilateral defence and security framework that extends beyond the Typhoon programme to encompass wider industrial cooperation, intelligence sharing protocols, and joint exercise arrangements.

The F-35 was lost, but the Typhoon — arguably the more capable air-superiority platform in a non-stealth environment — was secured through exactly the kind of strategic pressure that Ankara has practiced since the T-LORAMIDS competition in 2009.

ISC Commentary: The Unintended Consequences of Sanctions

The irony is layered. US sanctions drove Türkiye from the F-35. The F-35’s loss drove Türkiye to the Eurofighter. The Eurofighter deal now positions the United Kingdom — not the United States — as Türkiye’s closest Western defence partner. Washington’s attempt to punish Ankara for the S-400 purchase has inadvertently transferred £8 billion in defence revenue and strategic influence from American to British industry.

This is not an isolated phenomenon. Sanctions regimes consistently produce second-order effects that sanctioning powers fail to anticipate. In Türkiye’s case, CAATSA did not compel Ankara to abandon the S-400 and return obediently to the Patriot queue. Instead, it accelerated Turkish investment in indigenous alternatives — the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, SIPER long-range air defence, Hisar-A and Hisar-O short- and medium-range systems — and opened the door to European partnerships that bypassed Washington entirely.

The Trump administration’s willingness to contemplate F-35 reinstatement in 2026 — after five years of CAATSA enforcement — is itself an acknowledgement that exclusion failed to achieve its strategic objectives. Türkiye did not become more compliant. It became more capable, more autonomous, and more expensive to re-engage.

The £8 billion Eurofighter deal is the clearest example of what happens when a great power attempts to enforce compliance through exclusion rather than partnership. Ankara did not capitulate. It adapted. And the strategic geography of Western defence industrial relationships shifted permanently as a result.