GICHD Data: 100 Million People at Risk from Explosive Ordnance Contamination Across 60+ Countries

Explosive ordnance contamination is often framed as a post-conflict legacy issue — but the GICHD’s pre-Mine Action Day data release shows active conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and Gaza are generating contamination at rates that outpace clearance capacity, with civilians accounting for over 90% of recorded casualties and 132,000 km² of Ukrainian territory — an area larger than England — now classified as suspected hazardous.

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Image attribution noted where applicable.

Technical Summary

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) published a situation assessment on 1 April 2026, ahead of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action (4 April), reporting that more than 100 million people across over 60 countries live with the daily risk of explosive ordnance contamination. Civilians account for more than 90% of recorded victims from landmines, cluster munitions, and other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), with children disproportionately represented among casualties.

Three active conflict zones dominate the current contamination picture. In Ukraine, landmines and ERW have killed over 1,200 people since February 2022, with suspected contamination covering 132,000 km² — approximately 22% of Ukraine’s total land area. Agricultural impact is severe: 38% of frontline agricultural enterprises report explosive ordnance risks affecting operations and threatening global food supplies. In Syria, landmines and ERW caused more than 1,600 casualties in 2025 alone, with civilians injured during farming, firewood collection, and returns to formerly displaced areas. In Gaza, the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has left widespread contamination threatening returning families and humanitarian workers.

Two high-level events in Geneva during April 2026 will address these challenges: the Ukraine Mine Action Partner Coordination Workshop (20–21 April), co-hosted by Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture and the GICHD; and the 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers (22–24 April), the largest annual global gathering on mine action.

Analysis of Effects

The ordnance types driving contamination in these theatres differ significantly, with distinct implications for clearance operations and WOME personnel:

Contamination by Theatre — Ordnance Profile

Ukraine: Anti-personnel mines (PFM-1 “Butterfly” scatterable mine, HD 1.1 S; PMN-2, HD 1.1 D), anti-vehicle mines (TM-62M, NEQ ~7.5 kg TNT), cluster munition remnants (BLU-97 submunitions, HD 1.1 D, ~287 g Cyclotol fill), artillery-delivered Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) from 122 mm and 152 mm HE-FRAG projectiles (NEQ 3–7 kg TNT equivalent), and improvised mines. Scatterable mines and cluster munitions present the highest area-denial hazard.

Syria: Conventional landmines, aircraft-delivered HE bombs (OFAB-series, FAB-250/500), cluster munitions (RBK-series dispensers with PTAB and AO-2.5RT submunitions), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) including Victim-Operated IEDs (VOIEDs) deployed by non-state actors. IED contamination is particularly challenging as non-standard construction defeats systematic detection protocols.

Gaza: Aircraft-delivered precision-guided munitions and unguided bombs with high dud rates in rubble environments, artillery-delivered HE-FRAG, tank-fired 120 mm APFSDS and HE rounds, and remnants from rocket systems. Dense urban rubble creates extremely hazardous clearance conditions with multiple ordnance types co-located at varying depths.

The 132,000 km² contamination estimate for Ukraine represents the suspected hazardous area (SHA), not the confirmed hazardous area (CHA). Under International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), SHA requires non-technical survey (NTS) to determine whether contamination is confirmed, which then triggers technical survey (TS) and clearance operations. The gap between SHA and CHA means that the actual contaminated area requiring clearance is likely a fraction of the headline figure, but the survey task itself represents a multi-year workload.

Personnel and Safety Considerations

For WOME professionals and EOD operators, the GICHD data highlights three operational priorities. First, the scale of contamination in Ukraine alone exceeds the clearance capacity of all existing national and international mine action organisations combined. The Ukraine Mine Action Partner Coordination Workshop in April aims to align international support with Ukraine’s national mine action strategy, but the clearance timeline is measured in decades, not years.

Second, the diversity of ordnance types across these theatres demands broad competence. An EOD operator in Ukraine must be qualified to address conventional mines, scatterable munitions, cluster munition remnants, artillery UXO, and IEDs — a range that spans the full IMAS EOD competency framework (IMAS 09.30) and multiple NATO STANAGs including STANAG 2389 (EOD Principles).

Third, the agricultural contamination data (38% of frontline enterprises affected) has direct implications for humanitarian demining prioritisation under Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) principles. ALP-16 (STANAG 2617) provides the NATO framework for risk-informed clearance prioritisation, while IMAS 07.14 (Risk Management in Mine Action) governs humanitarian operations.

Data Gaps

DATA GAP: Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) versus Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) — The 132,000 km² figure for Ukraine is SHA. The proportion that has been surveyed and confirmed as contaminated, and therefore requiring clearance, is not specified in the GICHD release. CHA is the operationally actionable figure.

DATA GAP: Gaza contamination extent — No area estimate in km² was provided for Gaza. The density of contamination per km² in urban rubble environments is likely to be significantly higher than rural contamination in Ukraine, but requires separate quantification.

DATA GAP: Clearance capacity versus contamination generation rate — Whether international mine action capacity is keeping pace with new contamination in active conflict zones is not addressed. If contamination is being generated faster than it is being cleared, the 100 million at-risk figure will increase.

Authoritative References & Evidential Record

  1. 1. GICHD — “High-Level Mine Action Events in Geneva Highlight Growing Civilian Risk from Explosive Ordnance,” 1 April 2026. [Link] [A/2]
    Primary source for contamination statistics, casualty data, and April 2026 Geneva event details.
  2. 2. UNMAS — “International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action — 4 April 2026,” April 2026. [Link] [A/2]
    UN Mine Action Service official statement corroborating civilian casualty data and contamination scale.
  3. 3. ALP-16 / STANAG 2617 — Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM). [A/1]
    NATO framework for risk-informed munitions management and clearance prioritisation.
  4. 4. IMAS 09.30 — Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Third Edition). [Link] [A/1]
    International Mine Action Standards governing EOD competency and procedures.
Corrections & Updates
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