Operation Epic Fury Munitions Depletion: 5,197 Rounds in 96 Hours Exposes Sole-Source Energetics Production Bottlenecks

Technical Summary

Analysis published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) on 16 March 2026 provides the most detailed open-source accounting of munitions expenditure during the opening 96 hours of Operation Epic Fury, the US-led military campaign against Iran that commenced on 28 February 2026. The coalition fired approximately 5,197 munitions across 35 distinct types, representing what FPRI describes as “the most intensive opening air campaign in modern history” — substantially exceeding the 735 munitions used in the first three days of the 2011 Libya intervention.

The munitions-only replacement cost is estimated at $10–16 billion for four days of operations. Combined with sensor losses (AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, multiple AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars across the Gulf) and aircraft losses (three F-15E Strike Eagles, eleven MQ-9 Reaper UAS), the total reconstitution bill approaches $20 billion.

The critical finding for WOME professionals is not the aggregate expenditure figure but the identification of sole-source production bottlenecks in the energetics and propulsion supply chains that constrain regeneration capacity regardless of available funding.

Analysis of Effects

Critical Munition Depletion Rates

Sole-Source Energetics Production Vulnerabilities

The FPRI analysis identifies three sole-source nodes in the US munitions supply chain that represent single points of failure for energetics production:

• Holston Army Ammunition Plant (AAP), Kingsport, Tennessee: The sole US domestic producer of RDX (cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine) and HMX (cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine), the two secondary high explosives used in virtually every US precision-guided munition, torpedo warhead, and shaped-charge warhead. RDX is the base explosive in Composition B, Composition C-4, and PBXN-series insensitive munitions fills. HMX is the primary energetic in LX-14 and PBXN-5 compositions. Loss of or damage to Holston AAP would halt US munitions production across all services.
• AMPAC Fine Chemicals, Cedar City, Utah: The sole US domestic producer of ammonium perchlorate (AP), the oxidiser used in virtually all solid rocket motors including those in Tomahawk boost motors, Standard Missile variants (SM-2, SM-3, SM-6), Patriot PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, Hellfire, Javelin, and Stinger. AP constitutes approximately 70% by weight of typical composite solid propellant formulations.
• Williams International, Walled Lake, Michigan: Sole producer of the F107 turbofan engine, which powers the Tomahawk cruise missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), JASSM Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). A single engine production line serves four distinct weapon programmes.

Critical Minerals Dependency

Replenishing 5,197 expended munitions requires specific critical minerals for guidance electronics, motor assemblies, and warhead components. The FPRI analysis quantifies the requirement: 92 tonnes of copper, 137 kg of neodymium, 18 kg of gallium (China controls 98% of global production and banned US exports in December 2024), 37 kg of tantalum, and 7 kg of dysprosium (China controls 99% of processing capacity). These mineral dependencies represent a second-order supply chain vulnerability beyond the energetics bottleneck.

Personnel and Safety Considerations

For UK WOME professionals, the Operation Epic Fury depletion data carries direct implications for the UK’s own munitions regeneration capacity. The UK Strategic Defence Review 2025 (SDR 2025) committed £1.5 billion to building at least six new energetics and munitions factories under Project NOBEL. The US experience demonstrates that production capacity without supply chain resilience is insufficient: if BAE Systems Glascoed (the UK’s only filling factory) represents a sole-source node equivalent to Holston AAP, the UK faces an analogous single-point-of-failure risk.

CASG (AC/326), the NATO Ammunition Safety Group, and its Sub-Group A (Energetic Materials) have direct oversight of the qualification standards (STANAG 4170 for explosive materials) that govern the introduction of new energetics production sources. Qualifying a second source for RDX or HMX production to STANAG 4170 typically requires 3–5 years of testing, characterisation, and lot acceptance. The timeline for resolving sole-source vulnerabilities is measured in years, not months.

Under the ESMRM (Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management) framework (NATO ALP-16, STANAG 2617), stockpile management and regeneration capacity are recognised as essential components of operational readiness. The Epic Fury data suggests that current NATO regeneration capacity is calibrated for peacetime consumption rates, not high-intensity conflict expenditure.

Data Gaps

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Image attribution noted where applicable.

Corrections & updates welcome. If you hold open-source data that refines or corrects any parameter in this article, please contact [email protected] citing the specific claim and your source. Verified corrections will be incorporated and credited in the revision history.