The Nine Materials: A Technical Profile for WOME Practitioners

The MOD’s guidance, published on 2 April 2026 via GOV.UK, moves beyond generic references to “munitions capacity” and names the specific energetic materials for which it will fund new production facilities. This level of specificity is unusual in UK defence procurement communications and gives WOME practitioners a clear signal about where sovereign capability gaps exist. The nine named materials span the full spectrum of military energetics — from high explosives and propellants to pyrotechnic compositions and rocket motor oxidisers.

What stands out is the breadth of this list. The MOD is not simply seeking more 155mm shell filling capacity — it is attempting to rebuild sovereign capability across the entire energetics value chain, from primary explosive synthesis through propellant manufacture to pyrotechnic igniter production. The inclusion of ammonium perchlorate is particularly significant: AP is the oxidiser in virtually every Western composite solid rocket motor, from Brimstone and ASRAAM to the booster stages of Storm Shadow. UK production of AP has been absent for decades, with supply dependent on US and European sources.

Programme Structure and What Companies Need to Know

Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) will administer the programme through a series of investment windows. The first opens in Q3 2026, with subsequent rounds in Q2 and Q4 2027. Each window remains open for approximately three months. The funding model is a capital grant capped at £45 million or 50% of total project costs, whichever is lower — meaning the MOD expects private capital to match or exceed its contribution.

Companies do not need prior MOD engagement to apply. This is a departure from typical defence procurement, where established prime contractors and their supply chains dominate. SMEs, new entrants, and companies from adjacent chemical manufacturing sectors can all bid. The MOD has stated it will assist viable proposals in identifying suitable sites and engaging regulators — a recognition that COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazards) permitting and Health and Safety Executive (HSE) licensing for explosives manufacturing represent significant barriers to entry that government can help de-risk.

Applicants must deliver a 15-minute pitch addressing proposed materials, manufacturing scale and approach, economic viability, market demand assumptions (including surge and reduced-demand scenarios), and export potential. The emphasis on export markets is notable. The MOD recognises that sovereign energetics factories cannot be sustained by UK military demand alone — they need commercial viability through allied nation sales and, where appropriate, civilian applications.

Regulatory Context: DSA 03.OME and COMAH

Any new energetics manufacturing facility in the UK will fall under the Defence Safety Authority’s (DSA) regulatory framework — specifically DSA 03.OME, which replaced JSP 482 as the governing regulation for ordnance, munitions, and explosives safety within the MOD estate. Facilities handling quantities above the COMAH thresholds will additionally require a safety report under the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015 (as amended by the Explosives Regulations 2014).

For new-build facilities, this means site selection, design, and construction must satisfy both MOD safety case requirements and HSE regulatory standards simultaneously. The quantity-distance (QD) calculations under AASTP-1 Edition C — promulgated by NATO in 2023 with revised storage tables — will govern the separation distances between process buildings, storage areas, and surrounding communities. Getting these calculations right at the planning stage, rather than retrofitting them after construction, is a lesson the UK ammunition sector has learned through decades of operating legacy World War II-era facilities.

The Transatlantic Comparison: UK and US Energetics Bottlenecks

The UK’s challenge mirrors a parallel crisis in the United States. The Holston Army Ammunition Plant — built during WWII and still central to US high-explosives production — is the subject of a modernisation effort to expand annual RDX capacity from approximately 8 million pounds to about 15 million pounds. Even at the expanded rate, current US capacity represents roughly 1–2% of historical WWII production rates. Kevin Capozzoli of Critical Materials Group has warned that US explosives production “cannot scale for prolonged war,” identifying hundreds of single-point failures across the munitions supply chain.

The UK faces an analogous dependency. BAE Systems’ Glascoed facility in Wales and Chemring’s operations represent the core of UK energetics capacity. The SDR’s ambition to build up to six new factories is designed to distribute risk and create redundancy — ensuring that no single facility failure can halt national munitions production. Whether the £45 million grant cap, combined with private investment, is sufficient to build modern explosive manufacturing plants is the central question. Industry estimates for a greenfield RDX production facility typically run to £200–400 million depending on scale and regulatory compliance costs.

ISC Commentary

Further analysis pending.