WOME Intelligence

270+ Ballistic Missile ERW Contaminate West Bank: Ghadr and Emad Fragment Hazard Assessment

Intercepted missile debris is routinely dismissed as inert scrap metal — but Ghadr and Emad re-entry vehicle fragments up to 5 metres in length may retain residual energetic material, undetonated warhead sections, and intact fuze components that present a persistent Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) hazard to civilian populations with no access to shelters or organised EOD response.

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Technical Summary

At least 270 ballistic missile fragments have fallen across the occupied West Bank since the onset of Iranian strikes on Israel on 28 February 2026, according to Palestinian Authority (PA) Civil Defence figures reported on 27 March 2026. The fragments are concentrated near Ramallah, with additional confirmed fall sites near Nablus, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Salfit. An Israeli military official attributed fragments measuring 4–5 metres in length to Iranian Ghadr and Emad Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) variants.

The Ghadr-110 is a liquid-fuelled, single-stage MRBM derived from the Shahab-3 with an estimated range of 1,800–2,000 km and a separating warhead with an assessed payload capacity of approximately 750 kg. The Emad is a Ghadr derivative incorporating a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) designed to improve terminal accuracy. Both systems are assessed to carry unitary High Explosive (HE) warheads, though approximately half of the 300 missiles fired by day 10 of the conflict were reported to carry cluster munition payloads dispersing 20–80 submunitions per re-entry vehicle.

The fragments reported across the West Bank represent post-intercept debris from Israeli air defence engagements. Fragments of this scale — described as “the size of small trucks” — are consistent with intact or partially intact missile airframes, motor casings, and re-entry vehicle structural components that survived intercept but did not undergo complete high-order detonation of the warhead.

270 fragments across five governorates in 30 days equates to approximately 9 ERW items per day falling into a civilian-occupied area with no systematic EOD clearance capability and no public shelter infrastructure.

Analysis of Effects

The primary ERW hazard from intercepted ballistic missile debris falls into three categories. First, residual energetic material: partially detonated or undetonated warhead sections may contain residual secondary explosive fill. Iranian MRBM warheads are assessed to use TNT-based or Composition B-type fills. A partially intact 750 kg class warhead could retain a Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of 100–500 kg TNT equivalent, depending on the degree of warhead fragmentation during intercept.

Second, cluster munition submunitions: missiles carrying cluster payloads that are intercepted before submunition dispersal may scatter individual submunitions across a wide area in an unarmed, partially armed, or armed state. The failure rate of cluster submunitions is historically 5–40% depending on design and ground conditions. With an estimated 1,200–1,800 submunitions from cluster-equipped missiles potentially reaching Israeli and West Bank territory, the unexploded submunition population may number in the hundreds.

Third, missile motor propellant residue: liquid-fuelled missile stages (the Ghadr and Emad use Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid [IRFNA] as oxidiser and a hydrocarbon fuel blend) may disperse toxic and corrosive propellant components on impact. IRFNA is highly corrosive and produces toxic nitrogen dioxide (NO&sub2;) on contact with organic materials. Any fragment with visible liquid residue or strong acidic odour should be treated as a hazardous material (HAZMAT) incident in addition to an ERW threat.

Personnel and Safety Considerations

EOD and humanitarian mine action (HMA) operators responding to ballistic missile ERW should apply approach procedures consistent with the maximum credible NEQ of the debris. For intact re-entry vehicle fragments, initial Cordon and Evacuation Distance (CED) should be established at a minimum of 1,000 m until warhead state is assessed. For individual cluster submunitions, a minimum CED of 100–300 m is appropriate depending on assessed submunition type and fuze state.

The PA Civil Defence has reported response delays of approximately 2 hours to ERW fall sites due to movement restrictions and security incidents. This delay window represents an elevated public risk period during which uncontrolled civilian access to ERW is documented. Israel’s national ambulance service has warned that fragments “may appear harmless at first glance, but can pose a risk of explosion and [fragmentation].” The absence of public shelters for Palestinian populations in the West Bank, in contrast to Israeli civilian access to bomb shelters, creates an asymmetric casualty exposure profile.

Ammunition Technicians (ATs) and EOD operators should note that Iranian ballistic missile fuze systems are not well documented in open-source literature. Re-entry vehicle fuzing — whether impact, proximity, or command-detonated — may remain in an indeterminate state in fragments that experienced intercept shock but did not achieve high-order detonation. All fragments should be treated as potentially fuzed until confirmed safe.

Data Gaps

DATA GAP: Warhead explosive fill composition for Ghadr and Emad variants — not confirmed in open sources. TNT or Composition B assessed as most likely based on Iranian industrial capability, but insensitive formulations cannot be excluded.
DATA GAP: Cluster submunition type and designation — Iranian submunition design, fuzing mechanism, and individual NEQ not documented in open-source literature. Failure rate assessment based on historical analogues (5–40%).
DATA GAP: Intercept mechanism and warhead fragmentation state — whether fragments result from kinetic intercept (hit-to-kill) or proximity blast determines the probability of residual energetic material. Data not available.
DATA GAP: PA Civil Defence EOD capacity — number of qualified EOD operators, equipment availability, and formal qualifications (e.g., IMAS 09.30 compliance) not reported.

AI-assisted technical assessment based on open-source material. Not a formal intelligence product. Classification: Open Source | AI-Assisted Technical Assessment.

ISC Commentary

Further analysis pending.

Analysis & Evidence References

[1] Al-Monitor: The Huge Iranian Missile Fragments Scattered Across Israel, West Bank (27 Mar 2026) — STANAG 2022: B/2
[2] Times of Israel: A Look at the Giant Iranian Missile Hulls Scattered Across Israel and the West Bank (27 Mar 2026) — STANAG 2022: B/2
[3] Wikipedia: 2026 Iranian Strikes on Israel — compiled open-source overview — STANAG 2022: D/3
[4] IMAS 09.30: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (International Mine Action Standards)
[5] Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) — Iran is not a signatory state
[6] NATO ALP-16 / STANAG 2617: Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM)
Disclosure: This analysis is AI-assisted and based on open-source material. It does not constitute official intelligence or legal advice. All claims are sourced and evaluated using NATO STANAG 2022 methodology. © 2026 Integrated Synergy Consulting Ltd.