Denmark’s ATMOS/PULS Gamble: A Capable System Bought Badly

2. The Procurement — Speed Over Process

In January 2023, Denmark committed to donating all 19 of its ordered Nexter CAESAR 155 mm SPHs to Ukraine. The decision created an immediate gap in the 1st Brigade’s artillery — a formation assigned to NATO’s rapid-reaction force. Closing that gap was a genuine operational imperative, not manufactured urgency.

The Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation (DALO, known domestically as Forsvarets Materiel- og Indkøbsstyrelse, FMI) conducted market research and settled on Elbit Systems. Two contracts were signed on 2 March 2023:

The ATMOS had history with Denmark. It was a finalist in the original 2017 competition that the CAESAR won. And the bundled package — ATMOS for tube artillery plus PULS for long-range rocket and missile capability — gave Denmark breadth that a straight CAESAR replacement would not have provided. The PULS is a multi-calibre launcher accommodating 122 mm unguided rockets (35 km range) through to 370 mm Predator Hawk guided missiles (300 km), delivering deep-strike flexibility from a battalion-level asset.

That said, Nexter offered replacement CAESARs at approximately €89 million for 19 units — cheaper, with full training and spares compatibility already established. Nexter stated it could deliver by end-2023. The CAESAR option would have avoided integration costs, C4I reconfiguration, and the training overhead of introducing an entirely new platform. DALO chose capability breadth and Elbit’s delivery commitment over the simpler, cheaper, faster alternative.

The Financial Ledger

3. What Actually Went Wrong — The Parliamentary Deception

The operational need was real. What followed was not.

Defence Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen — also Deputy Prime Minister and Venstre party leader — told the Folketing’s security and finance committees that Elbit’s offer would expire at the end of January 2023, that competitive bids from Nexter and Hanwha (South Korea) had been assessed, and that no alternative could deliver in time.

None of this was accurate. Altinget journalists Katrine Lønstrup, Kasper Frandsen, and Andreas Krog — later Graver Prize nominees — demonstrated in June 2023 that the competitive bidding narrative did not reflect genuine market engagement. By August, the Ministry admitted that Elbit’s offer was valid until June 2023, not January. Nexter confirmed it could have delivered by end-2023. The Folketing Finance Committee had received “incorrect information.”

Permanent Secretary Morten Bæk was dismissed. Ellemann-Jensen apologised, stepped down, and by October 2023 had left politics entirely.

Bruun & Hjejle (November 2024)

The independent investigation by law firm Bruun & Hjejle found three categories of institutional failure. First, parliamentary documentation contained false information about the Elbit offer’s validity — the fabricated January deadline that manufactured artificial urgency. Second, FMI’s market assessment was “in significant respects contrary to FMI’s own guidance” on procurement market investigations. Third — and most consequential — FMI failed to disclose a settlement agreement with Elbit, reportedly finalised during an FMI delegation visit to Israel on 8–10 January 2023. Bruun & Hjejle judged disclosure “both relevant and necessary” and found a “presumption that there was an actual connection” between that settlement and the decision to contract with Elbit.

The settlement terms remain unpublished.

In April 2024, Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen disclosed that total programme cost could exceed estimates by up to DKK 1 billion. His assessment was blunt: “There has been no correct cost estimate for the purchase since it was initiated.”

4. The GNSS Vulnerability — Civilian GPS on a Fire-Support Platform

In January 2025, Danish broadcaster DR Nyheder reported that both ATMOS and PULS platforms were delivered with civilian-grade Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers. The Defense Post subsequently confirmed. This is the finding that most concerns WOME practitioners.

Two GPS systems are involved and the distinction matters. Munition-level GPS — fitted to Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) fuze assemblies on 155 mm projectiles and to GPS/INS guidance units on EXTRA and Predator Hawk rockets — provides terminal guidance. These may carry military-grade receivers. Elbit states it “provides all precise rocket munitions combined with military GPS with some of the most advanced capabilities in the world.”

Platform-level GNSS is the receiver on the truck itself, feeding the fire-control computer with the platform’s geographic coordinates. This determines the firing solution’s origin point. A platform that cannot accurately determine its own position cannot generate reliable firing solutions — regardless of how sophisticated the munition guidance is. Both claims can be simultaneously true, and the platform-level vulnerability remains operationally significant.

Civilian GNSS (unencrypted C/A-code) is susceptible to both jamming (signal denial) and spoofing (false position injection). Military M-code GPS is encrypted and resistant to both. Russia has deployed extensive GNSS denial across the Ukrainian battlespace. Any NATO fire-support platform committed to the eastern flank faces this threat environment.

Danish authorities acknowledged the vulnerability. DR Nyheder reported doubt about retrofit feasibility across all systems, with estimates of “several years” for any upgrade programme. Elbit markets an Immune Satellite Navigation System (iSNS) as an anti-jamming solution, but compatibility with Danish-configured platforms and commercial terms remain unclear from open sources.

Colonel Villumsen’s pragmatism is notable. The systems are being operated despite the limitation, because the alternative — leaving the 1st Brigade without tube artillery while waiting for a perfect solution — would be worse. That is battlefield reality. But it is also a sustained capability gap during a period when NATO is asking Denmark to be ready to fight.

5. The Ammunition Qualification Question — 60,000 Combinations and Who Controls the Lock

Beneath the political scandal lies a question that WOME professionals will recognise from their own experience: ammunition qualification regimes and who they protect. The answer, when examined through verified procurement data, reveals that the ATMOS switch may have delivered Denmark a structural advantage that its critics have entirely overlooked.

The 60,000-Combination Problem

NATO’s own staff studies have quantified the scale of the interoperability gap. Across five major 155 mm ammunition producers and the Alliance’s inventory of gun types, charges, projectiles, and fuzes, there are more than 60,000 theoretical ammunition-platform combinations. Comprehensive testing of every combination is physically and financially impossible. STANAG 4425 establishes procedures for determining interchangeability — guaranteeing physical fit and safety — but explicitly does not guarantee operational interoperability. A round that chambers safely may produce ballistic performance outside the fire-control solution’s prediction envelope.

Ukraine has demonstrated what this means in practice. Forces firing ammunition from multiple NATO donors through the same gun types reported dispersions of 10–50 metres beyond predicted impact points when switching between manufacturers’ rounds — not a safety failure, but an operational one. As Allied Ordnance Publication AOP-29, which compiles national Electronic Pressure, Velocity, and Action Time (EPVAT) test results, states: “judgment on whether this constitutes a basis for interchangeability is entirely left to countries.” The standard sets the test. It does not enforce the outcome.

CAESAR’s Vertically Integrated Supply Ecosystem

The CAESAR operates within what WOME practitioners will recognise as a vertically integrated ammunition supply chain. Nexter (now KNDS France) manufactures the gun. Nexter Munitions produces the primary ammunition lines: the LU 211 high-explosive round, the LU 220 smoke/illumination family, and the KATANA precision-guided munition. EURENCO manufactures the modular propellant charges at its Bergerac facility — Nexter placed a major order in 2021 for 70,000 Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) modules specifically for CAESAR users. The entire kill chain from platform to projectile to propellant sits within one corporate family.

This integration extends through licensing. Czech firm STV Group manufactures CAESAR ammunition under licence from Nexter Munitions. Saudi Arabia’s Wahaj consortium produces locally under a similar arrangement. In each case, the critical control point is what the industry terms “testing ammunition for specifics of a particular cannon” — a process that remains with Nexter even when third-party manufacturers produce the physical rounds. The platform manufacturer retains de facto authority over which ammunition is qualified for its gun.

In January 2024, NSPA signed €1.1 billion multinational framework contracts with Nexter Munitions and JUNGHANS Defence to supply 220,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition. This is not a monopoly — other manufacturers can and do supply 155 mm rounds that are STANAG-compliant. But the combination of platform-specific qualification authority, established NSPA framework contracts, and vertically integrated propellant supply creates what economists would call a structural market advantage. Nations operating CAESAR face higher friction when sourcing outside the Nexter ecosystem.

ATMOS’s Open Architecture — And the Danish Evidence

The ATMOS makes a different commercial proposition. Elbit markets the system as firing “all types of qualified 155 mm ammunition, projectiles and charges that are in use by NATO and other countries.” Multiple procurement competitions have cited this as a deciding factor — Argentina, Morocco, and Brazil all explicitly referenced the ATMOS’s open technology ammunition system in their selection rationale.

Denmark’s own procurement record provides the most concrete evidence that this is not merely marketing language. Since selecting the ATMOS, Danish authorities have sourced ammunition from four manufacturers across four nations:

This is not theoretical openness. Denmark has successfully decoupled its ammunition supply chain from its platform manufacturer. Nammo’s HE-ER rounds were validated during firing trials at Yuma Proving Ground alongside the ATMOS platform. Excalibur International’s €213.7 million contract represents the largest single ammunition order — from a Czech manufacturer with no corporate relationship to Elbit. If the ATMOS imposed the same qualification friction as vertically integrated competitors, this multi-vendor sourcing pattern would not exist.

The Systemic Problem — Guarantee Contracts and Proprietary Lock-In

The CAESAR-ATMOS comparison illuminates a NATO-wide structural problem. Five barriers prevent genuine ammunition interoperability across the Alliance, regardless of what STANAGs promise:

National deviations. Fourteen NATO nations have formally reserved the right to deviate from 155 mm ammunition standards. Each deviation creates a national pocket where interchangeability breaks down.

Guarantee and maintenance contracts. Platform manufacturers typically impose 20–30 year contracts that void warranty if non-approved ammunition is fired. NATO’s own Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP), published February 2025, explicitly called for “flexible contracts” as a reform priority — an acknowledgment that current contract structures impede interoperability.

Proprietary ballistic data. Fire-control solutions require manufacturer-specific ballistic tables. Without access to these tables, third-party ammunition cannot be programmed into the gun’s computer even if physically compatible. This data is commercial intellectual property.

Software barriers in fuze-setting equipment. Ukrainian forces discovered that US inductive fuze setters could not programme NATO-allied fuzes despite both meeting STANAG 4369 specifications. The hardware was compatible. The software simply lacked the encoding tables for allied fuze models. This is not a standards failure — it is an implementation gap that no STANAG currently addresses.

Per-platform qualification costs. Each ammunition type requires separate qualification on each gun type. A manufacturer seeking to supply a new platform faces testing costs of several million euros and timelines of 12–24 months — a barrier that disproportionately protects incumbents against new entrants.

The Joint Ballistics Memorandum of Understanding (JBMOU), signed in 2009 by only five nations (the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom), attempted to address some of these barriers by sharing ballistic test data. Denmark is not a signatory. The JBMOU’s limited membership — five of thirty-two Alliance members — illustrates how far NATO remains from resolving what its own officials describe as the 60,000-combination problem.

6. The NSPA Corruption Probe — Context and Proportion

On 31 July 2025, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) suspended Elbit Systems and subsidiary Orion Advanced Systems from new tenders. Thirteen of 15 suspended contracts involved Elbit or Orion, with a combined value of approximately €100 million. The probe, led by Belgian and Luxembourg prosecutors, warrants serious attention — but also proportion.

Central to the investigation is Guy Moeraert, described in much reporting as a former NSPA “agent.” This framing deserves precision. Moeraert was a technician at NSPA. He held no procurement authority — he could not approve, award, or modify contracts. He is accused of receiving €1.9 million in exchange for passing confidential tender documents to bidding companies to rig calls for proposals. That is a serious corruption allegation involving insider information, not procurement decision-making authority. The distinction matters for understanding the scope and nature of the vulnerability exploited.

Eliau Eluasvili, a 60-year-old Italian consultant believed to be a key Elbit intermediary, is the subject of a European Arrest Warrant issued September 2025 for “active corruption and participation in a criminal organisation.” A third figure, Ismail Terlemez, a Turkish former NSPA employee, was arrested at Brussels Zaventem Airport in May 2025 and subsequently released.

Elbit’s position: the company is “not under investigation” and there “were no irregularities in its conduct.” The company draws a legal distinction between actions of external consultants and corporate conduct. This is a tenable legal position — but the pattern of 13 out of 15 suspended contracts involving one company and its subsidiary raises questions about the intermediary ecosystem around Elbit’s NATO business, regardless of direct corporate culpability.

The suspended contracts include ammunition categories for truck-mounted howitzers and mobile rocket artillery — the weapon types Denmark procured bilaterally. The NSPA suspension does not affect Denmark’s existing bilateral contracts, but it constrains future Elbit procurement through NATO-channelled frameworks.

7. ESG Policy and the 2015 Precedent

In 2015, an earlier attempt to procure the ATMOS was effectively vetoed by the Folketing on human rights grounds. Martin Lidegaard of the Social Liberal Party stated that Denmark should not contract a company contributing to violations of international law — referencing Elbit’s supply of systems to the Israel Defense Forces, including along the separation barrier the ICJ ruled illegal. Denmark chose the CAESAR.

Danish institutional investors had already moved. Danwatch blacklisted Elbit in January 2010. Danske Bank excluded it from investment portfolios the same month. PKA Ltd divested ~USD 1 million in Elbit shares. PFA Pension, Denmark’s largest pension fund, added Elbit to its exclusion list in December 2015 for “violation of basic human rights, which conflicts with UN Global Compact principles 1 and 2.”

The 2023 procurement overrode fifteen years of institutional ESG positioning. The operational urgency argument had substance — the 1st Brigade needed guns. But the non-competitive process, false parliamentary timelines, and undisclosed settlement suggest the urgency argument was instrumentalised beyond its genuine scope to foreclose scrutiny that would have resurfaced the ESG question.