Iranian Ballistic Missile Strikes on Dimona and Arad: Cluster Munition Warhead Types and Terminal Effects Assessment

ISC Defence Intelligence

Between 21 and 22 March 2026, Iranian ballistic missiles struck the Israeli towns of Arad and Dimona. The attacks resulted in at least 180 civilian casualties: 116 wounded in Arad (seven serious injuries) and 64 wounded in Dimona (one serious injury). Initial reporting indicated conventional warheads at impact sites, but technical analysis of wider Iranian strike patterns during Operation Roaring Lion confirms that Iran has been conducting extensive cluster munition warhead (CMW) employment since hostilities began. This assessment documents the warhead typologies involved, their terminal effects characteristics, and the implications for missile defence systems and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination risk.

For Weapons, Ordnance, Munitions, and Explosives (WOME) professionals and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, the proliferation of cluster munition submunitions (bomblets) across engagement areas presents a hazard classification and contamination challenge that extends well beyond the immediate tactical engagement.

Warhead Typologies: Cluster versus Conventional

Open-source reporting from Al Jazeera, Times of Israel, and Jerusalem Post confirms that Iran launched missiles fitted with conventional warheads specifically against Dimona and Arad. However, the broader strike campaign has employed cluster munition warheads extensively. The distinction is operationally significant: conventional warheads concentrate blast and fragmentation within a defined radius; cluster warheads disperse multiple submunitions (bomblets) across a dispersal area, presenting distinct hazard characteristics and mission-critical missile defence implications.

Iran’s inventory of ballistic missile platforms capable of carrying cluster warheads includes the Shahab-3 (medium-range) and Fattah (intermediate-range) families. The Shahab-3, with a reported payload capacity of approximately 750 kg, typically carries either (a) a single 20–30 submunition cluster warhead, or (b) a single conventional high-explosive warhead. The Fattah, with higher payload capacity, can carry cluster warheads dispersing 70–80 submunitions per warhead, though this has not been definitively confirmed in open source for this specific campaign.

Submunition Characteristics and Hazard Classification

Iranian cluster warheads are believed to employ submunitions designated for anti-personnel and anti-materiel effects. Estimated submunition mass ranges from 0.5 kg to 2.0 kg per unit, with fuzing systems that typically combine impact fuzes with anti-handling devices. From a hazard classification perspective (per STANAG 4439 and the UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods), cluster warhead submunitions are assigned:

• Hazard Division (HD) 1.1: For submunitions with armed fuzes or in an armed state at the moment of warhead dispersal.
• Hazard Division (HD) 1.2: For submunitions configured with non-detonating anti-handling fuzes that do not pose a mass explosion hazard.
• Estimated Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ): Assuming 25–30 kg per cluster warhead (aggregate submunition NEQ), individual submunitions carry 0.8–1.5 kg NEQ depending on submunition type and internal explosive configuration.

The specific fuze state of Iranian submunitions that dispersed during the Dimona and Arad strikes is not confirmed in open source. However, the widespread use of cluster variants across the campaign indicates that both anti-personnel and anti-materiel submunition types have been employed.

Missile Defence Challenge: Pre-Dispersal Intercept Requirement

David’s Sling medium-range air defence system, deployed around critical Israeli infrastructure, achieved multiple intercepts against incoming Iranian missiles. However, open-source reporting indicates that some missiles evaded interception. The technical issue cluster warheads present is fundamental: air defence systems must achieve warhead intercept before submunition dispersal occurs. A warhead that successfully disperses its submunitions across a 4–6 hectare area cannot be defeated by post-dispersal air defence. This is categorically different from a conventional warhead, where mid-course or terminal phase interception can prevent impact.

The Defence and Security Monitor and several open-source technical assessments note that current generation air defence systems optimised for single-warhead conventional missiles face degraded interception probability against cluster warheads launched in salvo. The terminal phase of a cluster warhead trajectory may exceed missile defence reaction time windows, particularly if multiple missiles are fired in coordinated attacks.

International Law & The Convention on Cluster Munitions

The Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and submunitions. As of 2026, 110 States are parties to the treaty; notably, neither Iran nor Israel are signatories. The United States, Russia, and China are also non-parties. This absence of treaty binding does not alter the operational reality that cluster submunitions create civilian casualties and long-term ERW contamination.

For NATO and allied nations, the employment of cluster munitions by non-signatories does not change existing air defence or civil protection requirements, but it does underline the importance of rapid ERW survey and clearance capability in any extended conflict.

Impact Assessment

WOME Practitioner Guidance

For EOD personnel operating in areas where cluster warhead employment is suspected or confirmed, the following priorities apply: (1) Establish systematic ERW survey protocols per IATG 01.90 (Version 3, 2021) to map submunition dispersal areas. (2) Classify individual submunitions by fuze type and arm/safe state before clearance or disposal. (3) Document all HD/CG classifications and NEQ figures per STANAG 4439 for inventory and risk management. (4) Coordinate with medical services on anti-handling fuze characteristics that may trigger during casualty extraction.

For air defence and missile defence system operators, the employment of cluster warheads by Iranian forces indicates a capability threshold that may signal further escalation. System commanders should review engagement algorithms to prioritise intercept confirmation (warhead disruption) over conventional warhead engagement sequencing. The tactical paradigm of cluster warhead defence is fundamentally different from conventional warhead air defence and may require doctrine updates, training adjustments, and in some cases hardware configuration changes.