Denmark's Elbit Procurement: Parliamentary Deception and Billion-Kroner Overruns
How Denmark’s rush to replace Ukraine-donated CAESAR howitzers with Israeli-made ATMOS and PULS artillery systems unravelled into its worst defence scandal in decades — toppling a Deputy Prime Minister, exposing institutional failures at DALO, and leaving the Danish Army with GPS-vulnerable platforms in an electronic warfare era.
The Deal That Broke a Government
When Denmark announced in January 2023 that it would donate all 19 of its ordered Nexter CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (SPHs) to Ukraine, the decision was framed as an act of allied solidarity that demanded urgent capability replacement. Within weeks, the Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation (DALO, known domestically as Forsvarets Materiel- og Indkøbsstyrelse or FMI) had settled on a single supplier: Elbit Systems Ltd of Israel.
The contract, announced on 2 March 2023, comprised two elements. A USD 119 million agreement covered 19 ATMOS 155 mm/52-calibre autonomous truck-mounted howitzers on 8×8 platforms, with delivery over two years. A second contract worth USD 133 million provided two batteries of Precise and Universal Launching System (PULS) multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) — eight systems total — along with rockets, missiles, training, and spare parts over three years. Combined value: USD 252 million.
The speed was presented as necessary. Defence Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen, who also served as Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Venstre (Liberal) party, told the Folketing’s security and finance committees that Elbit’s offer would expire at the end of January 2023, that competitive bids from France’s Nexter and South Korea’s Hanwha had been assessed, and that no alternative supplier could deliver within an acceptable timeframe.
None of this was true.
The Unravelling
The false premises began to collapse in June 2023 when Danish news outlet Altinget published an investigation that contradicted the competitive bidding narrative. Journalists Katrine Lønstrup, Kasper Frandsen, and Andreas Krog — later nominated for the prestigious Graver Prize — demonstrated that the market assessment presented to Parliament did not reflect genuine competition.
By August 2023, the Danish Ministry of Defence was forced into a series of admissions. Elbit’s offer had been valid until June 2023, not January — giving parliament months more time than claimed. Nexter Systems confirmed it could have delivered replacement howitzers by the end of 2023, not the “two years” the ministry had asserted. The Folketing Finance Committee had received, in the investigation’s careful language, “incorrect information” regarding bid deadlines and urgency.
The fallout was immediate and brutal. Permanent Secretary Morten Bæk was dismissed in August 2023. Ellemann-Jensen apologised to Parliament for providing misleading information, stepped down from the defence portfolio, and initially moved to the Economy Ministry. By October 2023, he had resigned from politics altogether. A cross-party parliamentary commission appointed law firm Bruun & Hjejle to conduct an independent legal investigation into the procurement.
What the Investigation Found
The Bruun & Hjejle investigation, completed on 14 November 2024, delivered a damning assessment of institutional failure at multiple levels within both FMI and the Ministry of Defence’s department. Its principal findings covered three areas.
First, documentation presented to Parliament contained erroneous information regarding the validity period of Elbit’s offer — the false January deadline that had been used to manufacture urgency.
Second, FMI’s market assessment was found to be “in significant respects contrary to FMI’s own guidance” on procurement market investigations, suggesting the agency may not have provided a balanced evaluation of competing suppliers.
Third, and perhaps most concerning, the investigation revealed that FMI had failed to disclose the existence of a settlement agreement between Elbit and FMI to the Ministry of Defence’s department. This settlement, reportedly finalised during an FMI delegation visit to Israel on 8–10 January 2023, was judged “both relevant and necessary” for FMI to have disclosed. The investigation found a “presumption that there was an actual connection” between this undisclosed settlement and the subsequent decision to contract with Elbit. The full terms of the settlement remain unpublished.
Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen, who succeeded Ellemann-Jensen, confirmed that further interviews would proceed to determine whether the settlement–contract nexus warranted employment-law consequences.
The Billion-Kroner Black Hole
In April 2024, the financial dimension of the scandal expanded significantly. The Ministry of Defence disclosed that the total programme cost could exceed original estimates by up to DKK 1 billion — approximately USD 145 million at prevailing exchange rates. The overrun stemmed from costs the initial estimate had failed to account for: additional vehicles, personnel, ammunition beyond contract munitions, and infrastructure establishment for the new systems.
Minister Poulsen characterised the situation in stark terms: “There has been no correct cost estimate for the purchase since it was initiated.” Full operational capability, originally projected for end-2025, was pushed to end-2026. The overrun would need to be absorbed from Denmark’s defence settlement funds — money that would otherwise have gone to other capability programmes.
Financial Summary
| Component | Value |
|---|---|
| ATMOS SPH contract (19 systems) | USD 119M |
| PULS MRL contract (8 systems + munitions) | USD 133M |
| Total platform contracts | USD 252M |
| Estimated additional programme costs | up to DKK 1B (~USD 145M) |
| Estimated total programme cost | ~USD 397M |
| Operational capability delay | ~12 months (end-2025 → end-2026) |
WOME Technical Assessment: Capable Platforms, Critical Vulnerability
Setting aside the procurement scandal, the ATMOS and PULS systems themselves represent credible fire-support capabilities. The ATMOS is a 155 mm/52-calibre howitzer mounted on an 8×8 high-mobility tactical truck, capable of firing six rounds in under 110 seconds before displacing. Denmark’s 1st Artillery Battalion at Oksbøl Barracks has tested the system extensively, including Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) munitions at the US Army’s Yuma Proving Ground, with reports of “stable performance and high accuracy even at extended ranges.” Live-fire exercises at Denmark’s Borris training area have led to a combat-readiness declaration.
The PULS is a multi-calibre rocket launcher accommodating 122 mm through 370 mm munitions, with range envelopes from 35 km (unguided 122 mm rockets) to 300 km (guided Predator Hawk missiles). All eight systems and most associated munitions were delivered by May 2024.
However, a significant technical vulnerability emerged in January 2025 when Danish broadcaster DR Nyheder and subsequently The Defense Post reported that both platform types were delivered with civilian-grade Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers rather than military-specification GPS. In a contested electromagnetic environment — the kind Russia has imposed across the Ukrainian battlespace — civilian GPS is susceptible to both jamming (signal denial) and spoofing (false position injection), potentially degrading platform positioning accuracy, fire-control solutions, and displacement timing.
Elbit contested the characterisation, stating it “provides all precise rocket munitions combined with military GPS with some of the most advanced capabilities in the world that have been operationally proven.” The distinction matters technically: munition guidance packages (such as PGK fuze assemblies) may carry military-grade GPS for terminal accuracy, while the truck platform’s own navigation and fire-control positioning system uses civilian receivers. Both claims can be simultaneously true — but the platform-level vulnerability remains operationally significant regardless of munition precision, because a fire-support platform that cannot accurately determine its own position cannot generate reliable firing solutions. Danish authorities acknowledged this platform-level vulnerability and stated that upgrades were needed, though DR Nyheder reported doubt about feasibility across all systems, with any retrofits estimated to take “several years.”
Elbit markets an Immune Satellite Navigation System (iSNS) as an anti-jamming GNSS solution. Whether this is compatible with Danish-configured ATMOS/PULS platforms, and on what commercial terms it might be offered, remains unclear from open sources.
The NATO Dimension: NSPA Corruption Probe
As if the Danish national scandal were not sufficient, Elbit Systems became entangled in a separate, NATO-wide crisis in 2025. On 31 July 2025, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) suspended Elbit and its subsidiary Orion Advanced Systems from new tenders. Of 15 NSPA contracts suspended due to suspected fraudulent activities, 13 involved Elbit or Orion, with a combined value of approximately €100 million.
The investigation, led by Belgian and Luxembourg prosecutors, centres on two consultants. Guy Moeraert, a former Belgian soldier and ex-NSPA agent, is accused of receiving €1.9 million in exchange for confidential tender documents that were forwarded to bidding companies to rig calls for proposals. He has served six months in prison and is currently on an electronic tag. Eliau Eluasvili, a 60-year-old Italian consultant believed to be a key Elbit intermediary, is the subject of a European Arrest Warrant issued in September 2025 for “active corruption and participation in a criminal organisation.” Belgian authorities believe he may be travelling under a false identity. The pair were reportedly connected through Ismail Terlemez, a Turkish former NSPA employee arrested at Brussels Zaventem Airport in May 2025 and subsequently released.
Elbit’s formal position is that the company is “not under investigation” and that “there were no irregularities in its conduct regarding any project with the NSPA.” The company distinguishes between the actions of external consultants and its own corporate conduct — a legal position that may be tested as the Belgian investigation progresses.
Critically, the suspended NSPA contracts include ammunition categories for truck-mounted howitzers and mobile rocket artillery systems — precisely the weapon types Denmark procured bilaterally. While the NSPA suspension does not directly affect Denmark’s existing bilateral contracts, it adds substantial reputational weight to any future procurement decisions involving Elbit within Danish or NATO-channelled frameworks.
The 2015 Precedent and the Pension Fund Parallel
Denmark’s relationship with Elbit did not begin in 2023. In 2015, an earlier attempt to procure the Elbit ATMOS 2000 was effectively vetoed by the Folketing on human rights grounds. Martin Lidegaard, spokesman for the Social Liberal Party, stated publicly that Denmark should not contract a company contributing to violations of international law — a reference to Elbit’s supply of surveillance and military systems to the Israel Defense Forces, including along the separation barrier ruled illegal by the International Court of Justice. Denmark chose the French CAESAR instead.
Danish institutional investors have maintained a consistent position. Danwatch, the Danish financial watchdog, added Elbit to its ethical blacklist of 35 companies in January 2010. Danske Bank, Denmark’s largest financial group, excluded Elbit from its investment portfolio the same month. PKA Ltd, a major pension fund, divested approximately USD 1 million in Elbit shares. PFA Pension, Denmark’s largest pension fund, added Elbit to its exclusion list in December 2015 for “violation of basic human rights, which conflicts with UN Global Compact principles 1 and 2.”
The dissonance between Danish institutional ESG positions — which have blacklisted Elbit for over fifteen years — and the government’s decision to award a quarter-billion-dollar defence contract to the same company has been a persistent theme in both Danish media and international commentary.
Has DALO Banned Elbit?
The direct answer: no. No evidence supports a claim that DALO has imposed a unilateral ban or formal exclusion of Elbit Systems from Danish procurement. The 2023 contract proceeded, all systems have been delivered, and the ATMOS is operational with the 1st Artillery Battalion. Elbit exhibited at DALO Days 2023, displaying systems already delivered to the Danish Army.
What has occurred is more textured. In 2015, parliamentary political will blocked an Elbit procurement. In 2023, a rushed process circumvented the conditions that had prevented the earlier deal, but the subsequent scandal, investigation findings, cost overruns, and technical revelations have severely damaged the institutional relationship. The NATO-level NSPA suspension, while not a Danish action, constrains Elbit’s access to Alliance procurement channels through which Denmark participates. The Bruun & Hjejle investigation’s finding of a “presumed connection” between an undisclosed settlement and the procurement decision raises questions that, depending on follow-up interview outcomes, could have further institutional consequences.
A formal ban may not exist, but the political, reputational, and procedural barriers to any future Danish procurement from Elbit are now significantly higher than they were before January 2023.
ISC Commentary
This case serves as a procurement cautionary tale that extends well beyond Denmark. The convergence of genuine operational urgency (replacing donated equipment for Ukraine), institutional shortcuts (false deadlines, suppressed competition, undisclosed settlements), and pre-existing ethical and political sensitivities around a particular supplier created conditions for catastrophic institutional failure.
For Weapons, Ordnance, Munitions, and Explosives (WOME) practitioners, the GPS vulnerability dimension merits particular attention. The distinction between platform-level civilian GPS and munition-level military GPS is technically real but operationally misleading — a fire-support platform that cannot accurately determine its own position cannot generate reliable firing solutions regardless of munition guidance sophistication. That Denmark’s Artillery Regiment is pragmatically operating the systems while acknowledging the limitation reflects battlefield reality, but the multi-year timeline for potential upgrades represents a sustained capability gap in a period of heightened European threat.
The NSPA corruption probe adds a layer of institutional risk that will shape Alliance procurement behaviour for years. The revelation that 13 of 15 suspended NSPA contracts involved a single company and its subsidiary raises systemic questions about intermediary-dependent procurement in NATO-channelled defence acquisition — questions that will resonate beyond any single supplier.